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ABSTRACT. The power control problem in data networks has become a critical op-
timization problem because nowadays the telecommunication resource is scarce and is
shared everywhere by more and more users of greedy applications. This optimization
problem is non-convex, because of the presence of these multiple users with their own
objectives associated. The user satisfaction is represented by a quality of service, based
on signal to interference ratio, and a cost term on user’s power. A user is able to
maintain the communication if its utility function reaches a lower threshold. In the
static case, the water-ﬁlling provides a well-known and elegant solution, corresponding
to a Nash equilibrium in the framework of Game Theory.
To cope with time-varying number of users, or with the evolution of the channel char-
acteristics, a new approach using an automata formulation of the game is presented
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in this paper. This approach is not based on the research of an equilibrium, but rather
on the veriﬁcation that some quantitative properties hold in the game. For instance,
we check if there exists a strategy for each user, which robustly guarantees the preser-
vation of the telecommunication link when a perturbation appears. The introduction
of a new user is a typical perturbation for the game. Futhermore this kind of approach
is a powerful tool and helps at the design of algorithms controling each user’s power
allocation, especially the threshold levels. A simpliﬁed Uppaal-TiGA model, with two
users using a single frequency channel, illustrates the robust behavior when a third
player wants to begin a communication.
RÉSUMÉ. Les systèmes de télécommunication connaissent un développement sans pré-
cédent. Ils sont devenus omniprésents, parfois indispensables, dans des domaines très
variés, et la capacité des réseaux est souvent un facteur limitant. Dans ces conditions,
le contrôle de la puissance d’émission de systèmes de communications est un problème
critique. C’est un problème d’optimisation non-convexe, du fait de la présence de dif-
férents utilisateurs, chacun ayant des objectifs variés. Globalement, les objectifs se
mesurent en termes de qualité de service calculée en fonction du rapport signal/bruit,
et du coût d’utilisation calculé en fonction de la puissance d’émission nécessaire. Dans
le cas stationnaire, le water-ﬁlling est une solution classique et élégante à ce problème,
correspondant aux équilibres de Nash de la théorie des jeux.
Dans cet article, nous proposons une nouvelle approche, basée sur une modélisa-
tion sous forme d’automates, pour traiter les cas non-stationnaires, où le nombre
d’utilisateurs ou les caractéristiques du réseau peuvent varier dans le temps. Notre
approche n’est pas fondée sur la recherche d’équilibre, mais plutôt sur la vériﬁcation
de propriétés quantitatives sur le modèle. Nous vériﬁons par exemple si un utilisateur
a une stratégie lui assurant de pouvoir émettre ses données malgré les perturbations
possibles sur le réseau. Un exemple de perturbation est l’apparition d’un nouvel utili-
sateur sur le réseau. Cette approche nous permet d’étudier diﬀérents algorithmes de
contrôle de puissance et d’obtenir de bonnes valeurs pour leurs paramètres. Nous illus-
trons notre approche à l’aide de l’outil Uppaal-TiGA, via un petit exemple dans lequel
un utilisateur peut communiquer de manière satisfaisante malgré les perturbations
engendrées par deux autres utilisateurs.
KEYWORDS: timed games, model checking, veriﬁcation, automata theory, digital sub-
scriber lines, multiuser power control
MOTS-CLÉS : jeux temporisés, model-checking, vériﬁcation, automates, DSL, contrôle
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1. Introduction
Telecommunication networks have modiﬁed in depth our society in the re-
cent years. It has become a technical challenge to let more and more people
exchange more and more information anywhere and at any time. This means
that in addition to the traditional perturbation of the Additive White Gaus-
sian Noise (AWGN) (Proakis, 1995), there exists an other kind of random
interference, due to the simultaneous existence of diﬀerent users in the same
frequency bands. This particularly holds in the framework of Digital Sub-
scriber Lines (DSL) (Bingham, 2000), for which there are two kinds of crosstalk
between adjacent lines: NEXT (Near-End Crosstalk) and FEXT (Far-End
Crosstalk), as described in (ANSI Std, T1.E1.4/2003-210R1, 2003). Note that
the same kind of problem arise in the case of mobile networks with for instance
the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) interference.
In these systems, each user’s performance not only depends on her own
power allocation, but also on the power allocation of all the other users. Each
user aims at maximizing her Signal to Interference-and-Noise Ratio (SINR),
in order to maximize her ﬂow rate. A ﬁrst intuition to maximize her own SINR
is to increase the corresponding power; however that implies a deterioration of
the SINR of the other users. In addition the global power is limited, because
the resources in energy are ﬁnite.
The required level of SINR depends on the application. There may not
be any feasible power allocation to satisfy the requirements of all the users.
The modiﬁcation of the number of users may also change these constraints
and corresponds to a hot topic in this framework. For example, an existing
set of requirements can be satisﬁed, but when a new user is admitted into the
system, there exists no more feasible power control solution by tightening of
the constraint set.
An additional diﬃculty is the strongly nonlinear relation between the ﬂow
rate of the transmission and the SINR. The ﬂow rate is a strictly increasing
function of the SINR. In view of Shannon’s second theorem (Shannon, 1949),
the capacity of a channel (i.e., the maximum ﬂow rate) is given by a logarithm
of the SINR. This kind of relation could be a plausible choice to link the current
ﬂow rate and SINR. To simplify, one maximizes the ﬂow rate when the SINR
is also maximized.
A ﬁrst and intuitive approach to reach this goal is to design a central-
ized power control. That is design a power control allocation by a centralized
agent, who gets all the information about the transmission system and about
the SINR of each user. Then this centralized agent assigns each user’s power
level. However this approach is limited: in this case, the propagation delays
could imply the instability of the control. Furthermore the formulation of the
power control problem as a global optimization problem is too constraigning
and could admit no feasible solution because of the complexity of the commu-4 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
nication network. On the other hand, considering this problem as a complete
decentralized optimization problem (that is, considering only single-user optim-
ization problems) does not allow to depict the diﬀerent crosstalk. The power
control allocation problem necessitates to be modelized as a distributed sys-
tem. Zander (Zander, 1992) and Yates (Yates, 1995) propose to consider power
control allocation as a constrained optimization problem, where each user min-
imizes her transmission power level, while keeping her SINR larger than an
upper threshold ensuring a good communication.
Game theory (Başar et al., 1995) is a framework for analyzing the interaction
of decision makers with conﬂicting objectives and limited resources. Recently in
the literature, the power control problem has been viewed as a non cooperative
game, in which each user attempts to minimize her own performance index
in response to the actions of the other users. Diﬀerent kinds of strategies
are investigated, like Pareto strategy (Falomari et al., 1998), or Stackelberg
strategy (Başar et al., 2002), or ﬁnally Nash strategy (Alpcan et al., 2005). The
literature providing a game-theoretic approach is rich in the telecommunication
ﬁeld (Ji et al., 1998; MacKenzie et al., 2001a; MacKenzie et al., 2001b; Yu et al.,
2002; Lee, 2006; Subramanian et al., 2005; Maheswaran et al., 1998; Başar et al.,
2002; İmer et al., 1999; Palomar et al., 2004; Palomar et al., 2003; Long et al.,
2007). A passivity approach should be noted (Fan et al., 2006). The obtained
results are noteworthy because conditions for the existence and the uniqueness
of equilibria can be pointed out. This approach includes the optimization
problem named water-ﬁlling (Chiang et al., 2007; Palomar et al., 2005), which
is a formulation using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of optimality
(Boyd et al., 2004, page 245). An equivalence between water-ﬁlling and Nash
equilibrium can be shown (Yu et al., 2002).
In this paper a new approach is provided. A simple algorithm represented
as an automata is applied to each user. The user increases her transmission
power if her SINR is less than a lower threshold, or decreases it if her SINR is
larger than an upper threshold, or maintain it if her SINR is included between
them. The model-checking tool Uppaal-TiGA (Behrmann et al., 2007) is used
to study the resulting system, and to verify if one of the users can ensure
correct communication quality whatever the other users do. Our objective
is twofold: we ﬁrst want to study our model for itself, and check if we can
ﬁnd correct values for the parameters in order to get a reliable system. But
we also aim at evaluating the performances of Uppaal-TiGA on our models.
For this second point, we will start with a small model and easy properties,
and then study extensions of both. Our experiments were carried out on a
3GHz-CPU computer equipped with 2Go RAM, and Uppaal-TiGA v0.11 (http:
//www.cs.aau.dk/~adavid/tiga/).
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the multiuser optimization
problem is stated, the water-ﬁlling solution and the simpliﬁed decentralized al-
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timed games we will use for modeling our systems. Section 4 depicts diﬀerent
timed games, with diﬀerent levels of abstraction, modeling our telecommu-
nication network. Finally, in Section 5, we present the results obtained with
Uppaal-TiGA.
2. Problem Statement
2.1. Problem formulation
In this section, the problem of multiuser power allocation is formulated.
In a multiuser telecommunication system, including N transmitters, each user
or player (k ∈ {1,...,N}) aims to transmit a signal xk through a collection
of channels. The outputs yi (i ∈ {1,...,N}) of the channels, or the received
signals are obtained by ﬁltering the send signals xk with the impulse response
hik of the channel. This ﬁltering is represented with a convolution and is
corrupted by adding a white gaussian noise ni. In the frequency domain, where
the Fourier transforms are noted with capital letter, the corresponding relations
are
Yi(f) =
N X
k=1
Hik(f)Xk(f) + Ni(f). [1]
By considering that the signals xk are independent, the interference theorem
allows to obtain the power P(yi,f) of the received signals.
P(yi,f) =
N X
k=1
|Hik(f)|2P(xk,f) + P(ni,f), [2]
=
N X
k=1,k6=i
|Hik(f)|2P(xk,f) + P(ni,f)
| {z }
Noise-Interference term
+|Hii(f)|2P(xi,f)
| {z }
Signiﬁcative term
. [3]
In this last expression [3], the Noise-Interference term and the signiﬁcative
term are stressed. The Noise-Interference term bring together the additional
white gaussian noise power and the power of the others users’ signals, cor-
responding to the diﬀerent crosstalk (NEXT, FEXT). The signiﬁcative term
corresponds to the power of the signals, the user i wants to transmit. This
leads to the deﬁnition of the Signal Interference Noise Rate (SINR).
Deﬁnition 1 The SINR of the user i at frequency f is deﬁned as the rate
γi(f) =
|Hii(f)|2P(xi,f)
PN
k=1,k6=i |Hik(f)|2P(xk,f) + P(ni,f)
. [4]6 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
In view of Shannon’s second theorem (Shannon, 1949), the capacity of a
channel (i.e., the maximum ﬂow rate) is given by a logarithm of the SINR.
This kind of relation could be a plausible choice to link the current ﬂow rate
and SINR. In the sequel of the paper, it is assumed that the ﬂow rate Qi(f) at
frequency f veriﬁes the relation
Qi(f) = log

1 +
γi(f)
Γ

, [5]
where Γ is a positive parameter, called the gap of the channel. This parameter
could be generally normalized to Γ = 1.
In practice, the transmission is digital, that the signal xk are sampled to be
transmitted. The frequency domain lies in [0,Fs], where Fs = Fmax
2 denotes
the Shannon’s frequency, related to the maximum frequency Fmax, which could
be transmitted in the channel. The global ﬂow rate is given by a integral over
all frequencies.
Qi =
Z Fs
0
Qi(f)df =
Z Fs
0
log

1 +
γi(f)
Γ

df. [6]
The purpose of each user is to maximize her own global ﬂow rate Qi. By
considering that the power of the other users are ﬁxed, an intuitive solution is
to increase her own power P(xi,f). However this simple solution necessitates
an inﬁnite resource in energy. That is obviously impossible. The optimization
of the global ﬂow rate should be designed by taking into account that the
resources in energy are ﬁnite. The constraints could be formalized as
1
Fs
Z Fs
0
P(xi,f)df ≤ Pi,max. [7]
Because there exist N objective values or criteria (the N global ﬂow rates) to
optimize, this is not possible to deﬁne a order relation with respect to a N-tuple.
Consequently, the notion of optimality has no sense in the present case. This is
necessary to call on Game Theory (Başar et al., 1995; Engwerda, 2005) and the
equilibrium associated with. The multiuser power control can be formulated
as the following non-convex and constrained optimization problem, which is a
constrained Nash strategy.
Deﬁnition 2 Design the N-tuple of functions
 
P∗(x1,f),...,P∗(xN,f)

,
such that for all functions
Qi
 
P∗(x1,f),...,P∗(xN,f)

≥ Qi
 
P∗(x1,f),...,P(xi,f),...,P∗(xN,f)

,
[8]
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2.2. Classical solving of the problem
For the sake of clarity, the next notation is used
z(f) =
 
P(x1,f),...,P(xN,f)

. [9]
To solve the multiuser power control problem, a Lagrangian is deﬁned for each
user
Li(z(f), ˙ z(f),f) = λ0

log

1 +
γi(f)
Γ

+ λ1 (P(xi,f) − Pi,max), [10]
where λ0 and λ1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with the
global cost Qi and the constraint [7]. The necessary conditions are given by
the Euler-Lagrange Equation
d
dt

∂Li
∂ ˙ z
(z(f), ˙ z(f),f)

=
∂Li
∂z
(z(f), ˙ z(f),f). [11]
In the particular case, where Li is independent on ˙ z(f), the Euler-Lagrange
Equation is degenerated and could be rewritten as
∂Li
∂z
(z(f), ˙ z(f),f) = 0. [12]
The equation [12] leads to the relation
λ0
∂
∂P(xi,f)

log

1 +
γi(f)
Γ

+ λ1 = 0. [13]
The Lagrange multipliers λ0 and λ1 cannot be simultaneously null. This
implies that they are both diﬀerent from zero and the optimization is normal.
The relation [13] can be rewritten as
Γ
N X
k=1,k6=i
|Hik(f)|2
|Hii(f)|2 P(xk,f) +
Γ
|Hii(f)|2P(ni,f) + P(xi,f) = Ki, [14]
where Ki is a constant. The fact that this frequency-weighting sum of all power
P(xk,f) and P(ni,f) is a constant independent on the frequency is known in
telecommunication as water-ﬁlling (Chiang et al., 2007; Palomar et al., 2005).
The determination of the constants Ki is an important ﬁeld of research (Yu et
al., 2002; Shum et al., 2007).
2.3. Decentralized Algorithms
In practice, the water-ﬁlling algorithm is not suitable, because of the dif-
ﬁculty of determining the constants associated with. In this paper, decent-
ralized algorithms are preferred. It is assumed that each user has access to8 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
her own SINR. This availability allows each user to decide if she increases or
decreases her own power allocation.
When the SINR is less than a low threshold, the ﬂow rate is not enough to
guarantee a correct communication, then the user should increase is power to
maintain the transmission. When the SINR is greater than a upper threshold,
the ﬂow rate is suﬃcient to guarantee a correct communication, but the con-
sumed energy is too important, then the user decreases her own power to
preserve is energy.
In order to allow an automata-theoretic approach to cope with such a de-
centralized structure, it necessitates several simpliﬁcations:
– To avoid the dependency with respect to the frequency domain, only one
frequency band is considered. This implies a simpliﬁcation of the integrals
deﬁning the global ﬂow rates and the constraints about the maximum power
available.
– The set of values of each user’s power is quantiﬁed. This leads to a quan-
tiﬁcation of the variations of the powers.
– The increasing or the decreasing of the powers are only allowed of one
increment.
In addition such a decentralized structure permits to easily take into account
a modiﬁcation of the number of users. In the following section, the notion of
automata is presented to be able to check the behavior of this model.
3. Timed automata and games
This section is devoted to the presentation of the models of timed automata,
introduced originally in (Alur et al., 1990), and their extension into timed
games (Maler et al., 1995; Asarin et al., 1998).
3.1. Timed automata
Timed automata (Alur et al., 1990; Alur et al., 1994) are now considered
as a natural, powerful and interesting model of real time systems. Roughly
speaking a timed automaton is a ﬁnite automaton enriched with clocks. In this
section we deﬁne and illustrate the notion of timed automaton. Let us ﬁrst
introduce some notations in order to deﬁne formally this notion.
We denote by X = {x1,...,xn} a set of n clocks. A clock valuation is a map
ν: X → R+, where R+ is the set of nonnegative reals. Given a clock valuation
ν, for i = 1,...,n, we denote by νi the image of the clock xi by the function ν,
i.e. ν(xi) = νi. Given a clock valuation ν, when no confusion is possible we also
denote by ν the element of (R+)n given by (ν1,...,νn). Given a clock valuationPower control algorithm for DSL 9
ν and τ ∈ R+, ν+τ is the clock valuation deﬁned by (ν1+τ,...,νn+τ). A guard
is any ﬁnite conjunction of expressions of the form xi ∼ c or xi −xj ∼ c where
xi and xj are clocks, c ∈ N is an integer constant, and ∼ is one of the symbols
{<,≤,=,>,≥}. We denote by G the set of guards. Let g be a guard and ν
be a clock valuation, notation ν |= g means that (ν1,...,νn) satisﬁes g. A reset
Y ∈ 2X indicates which clocks are reset to 0. We write AP for the set of atomic
propositions that will be used for labeling the locations of our automata.
Deﬁnition 3 A timed automaton A = (L,X,Σ,E,I,L) has the following
components: (i) L is a ﬁnite set of locations, (ii) X is a ﬁnite set of clocks,
(iii) Σ is a ﬁnite set of actions, (iv) E ⊆ L×Σ×G ×2X ×L is a ﬁnite set of
edges, (v) I: L → G assigns an invariant to each location, and (vi) L: L → 2AP
is the labeling function.
The semantics of a timed automaton A is given by a labelled transition
system TA. A state of A is a pair q = (l,ν) such that l ∈ L and ν |= I(l). We
let Q denote the set of all states.
We distinguish two kinds of transitions: time-transitions and switch-
transitions:
– Given q = (l,ν) and q0 = (l0,ν0) two states of A, there is a time-transition
in A between q and q0 if there exists τ ∈ R+ such that l = l0, ν0 = ν + τ and
ν + τ0 |= I(l) for any τ0, 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ τ. We denote this transition by q
τ − → q0.
– Given q = (l,ν) and q0 = (l0,ν0) two states of A, there is a switch-transition
in A between q and q0 if there exists e = (l,a,g,Y,l0) ∈ E such that ν |= g and
ν0 is given by
ν0
i =
(
0 if xi ∈ Y
νi if xi / ∈ Y.
We denote this switch-transition by q
e − → q0. To emphasize on the action a, we
also use notation q
a − → q0 in this case, we use the notation Action(e) = a.
We now deﬁne the (labelled) transition system TA.
Deﬁnition 4 Given a timed automaton A, the (labelled) transition system
associated with A is given by TA =
 
Q,Σ ∪ R+,→

where the transition
relation is given by
→ =
[
τ∈R+
τ − → ∪
[
e∈E
e − →.
Let A = (L,X,Σ,E,I,L) be a timed automaton, q1, q2 and q3 be three
states of A. If q1
τ − → q2, for some τ ∈ R+, and q2
e − → q3, for some e ∈ E,
we shortly denote q1
τ·e − − → this sequence of two transitions. A ﬁnite or inﬁnite
run ρ is sequence of alternating transitions of the form:
ρ = q1
τ1·e1 − − − → q2
τ2·e2 − − − → ···
τk·ek − − − → qk+1 ··· .10 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
We denote by RunA (resp. Run
f
A) the set of runs (resp. ﬁnite runs) of A.
Let us now give an example of timed automaton modelling a simple real
life system. We model a mouse producing simple or double click inspired
from (Krichen et al., 2005).
Example 1 In order to model a mouse producing simple or double click, the
timed aspect is essential. Indeed the mouse produces a double-click when the
button is pressed twice quickly enough; otherwise it just produces two simple-
click. In this example we assume that the mouse produces a double-click when
the button is pressed twice within 1 time unit. This situation can be modelled
by the one clock timed automata depicted on Fig. 1 together with the set of
atomic proposition AP given by {Idle,Simple,Double}.
`0
Idle
`1
x ≤ 1
Simple
`2
Double
x ≤ 1
click
x := 0
a ; x = 1
a ; x = 1
click ; x < 1
Figure 1: A timed automata modelling a simple-, double-click mouse
One of the most famous results on timed automata is the decidability of the
reachability problem. More precisely, the reachability problem has been shown
PSPACE-complete in (Alur et al., 1994). The key ingredient to prove this result
is the construction of a ﬁnite graph, namely the region graph, which is shown
to be time-abstract bisimilar to the original timed automaton. In particular,
the reachability problem on timed automaton reduces in the reachability prob-
lem on this ﬁnite region graph. Many other interesting model-checking-related
problems have been shown decidable on timed automata (Alur et al., 1993; Alur
et al., 1996). In parallel with these theoretical results, eﬃcient veriﬁcation tools
such as Uppaal, Kronos, ... have been implemented and successfully applied to
industrial relevant case studies (Daws et al., 1996; Larsen et al., 1997; Behr-
mann et al., 2004).
3.2. Timed games
Timed automata are models for as closed systems, where every transition
is controlled. If we want to distinguish between actions of a controller and
actions of an environment, or more generally if we need to model multi-agentPower control algorithm for DSL 11
systems, we have to consider games on timed automata, also known as timed
games (Maler et al., 1995; Asarin et al., 1998). In this context, we can ask if the
controller can force the environment to update the control of the automaton in
a way to achieve a given objective.
Deﬁnition 5 Let A = (L,X,Σ,E,I) be a timed automaton. We say that A
is a timed game, if the set of action Σ contains a particular action denoted u.
In this context, the transitions labelled with u are called the uncontrollable
transitions. They represent the set of actions available to the environment.
The other ones are called the controlled transitions. We denote by Σc the set
of actions Σ \ {u}.
Before giving the semantics of timed games, let us ﬁrst explain it intuitively.
Let A = (L,X,Σ,E,I) be a timed game. The game is played by two
players, Player 1 (the controller) and Player 2 (the environment). At any
state q, Player 1 picks a time τ and an action a ∈ Σc such that there is a
transition q
τ·e − − → q0 with Action(e) = a. Player 2 has two choices:
– either she can decide to wait for time τ and execute a transition q
τ·e − − → q0
proposed by Player 1,
– or she can wait for time τ0, 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ τ, and execute a transition q
τ
0·e
0
− − − → q00
with Action(e0) = u.
The game then evolves to a new state (according to the choice of Player 2) and
the two players proceed to play as before.
Notice that, in the deﬁnition of a timed game, it is implicitly supposed that
Player 1 can always formulate a choice (τ,a) in any reachable state q of the
game.
We will now formalize the semantics through the concept of strategy.
Deﬁnition 6 A (Player 1) strategy is a function
λ: Run
f
A 7→ R+ × Σc.
Before deﬁning the notion of a winning strategy, we need to deﬁne several
other notions. We say that a run ρ is maximal if it is either inﬁnite or ending
in a deadlock. An objective Ω of a timed game is a subset of the runs of A.
Let ρ be a run of the form q1
τ1·e1 − − − → q2
τ2·e2 − − − → ···
τk·ek − − − → qk+1 ···, we denote by
ρi the preﬁx of ρ ending in qi. Given a strategy λ and a run ρ, we say that ρ is
played according to λ if for every i, if λ(ρi) = (τ0
i,ai), then either τi = τ0
i and
Action(ei) = ai, or τi ≤ τ0
i and Action(ei) = u. We denote by Outcome(ρ,λ) the
set of maximal runs extending ρ and played according to λ. Given a state q,12 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
a strategy λ and an objective Ω, we say that the strategy λ is winning for the
objective Ω from q if Outcome(q,λ) ⊆ Ω.
In order to illustrate the more complex notion of timed game, let us give a
simple example.
Example 2 Let us ﬁrst imagine a simple process controlled by a user which
can work in two diﬀerent modes: Low or High. One can imagine that the High
mode is more eﬃcient but energy consumings. We impose two constraints on
this system. The ﬁrst constraint is that the user is not allowed to switch too
quickly from one mode to another, the second constraint impose that the user
really use the two diﬀerent modes. More precisely, when she enters the Low
(resp. High) mode, she has to stay between mL and ML (resp. mH and MH)
time units in this mode. This single user process can be modeled by the timed
automaton of Fig. 2.
`0
Low
x ≤ ML
`1
High
x ≤ MH
c ; x ≥ mL
x := 0
c ; x ≥ mH
x := 0
Figure 2: A system with High and Low modes
Now imagine that several copies of the our process run in parallel on the
same device. Each process is controlled by a diﬀerent user. In particular,
each user can choose independently when to run her own process on the Low
(resp. High) mode. Let us also assume that the device can not aﬀord that all the
process run in the High mode for a too long time. More precisely, the device
is blocked if all the process stay in the High mode for more than nine time
units. In this framework, one can naturally ask if a given user has a way of
controlling her own process in order to ensure that the device will not reach the
blocking state, whatever the other users will do. This situation can be modelled
via timed games.
The case of two users, with some given constants for the guards and in-
variants, is modelled in Fig. 3. In this ﬁgure, the locations `0 to `3 model the
diﬀerent modes of the two users and location `4 is the blocking location. In this
example, we see the ﬁrst user as the controller and the second user as the envir-
onment. One can show that the controller has no strategy to avoid the blocking
location from (`0,0,0,0). Even in this simple example, the non-existence of a
winning strategy is not obvious.Power control algorithm for DSL 13
`0
(L1,L2)
x1≤200 ; x2≤100
`1
(H1,L2)
x1≤50 ; x2≤100
`2
(L1,H2)
x1≤200 ; x2≤20
`3
(H1,H2)
x1≤50 ; x2≤20
`4
Block
c ; x1≥10
x1:=0
c ; x1≥10
x1:=0
c ; x1≥10
x1,y:=0
c ; x1≥10
x1:=0
u ; x2≥15
x2:=0
u ; x2≥5
x2:=0
u ; x2≥15
x2,y:=0
u ; x2≥5
x2:=0
y≥9
Figure 3: Example of a timed game
3.3. Timed ATL
TATL (Henzinger et al., 2006; Brihaye et al., 2007) is a temporal logic used
to specify timed requirements when the model consists of a multiplayer system,
it extends the untimed logic ATL (Alur et al., 2002) (alternating-time temporal
logic). Formulae written with TATL may be later used as an input along with
the model in a model-checking tool to check whether our system satisfy the
requirements or not.
Deﬁnition 7 The syntax of TATL is deﬁned by the following grammar:
TATL 3 ϕs,ψs ::= > | P | ¬ϕs | ϕs ∨ ψs | h hAi iϕp
ϕp ::= ϕs U∼c ψs | ϕs R∼c ψs
with P ∈ AP, A ⊆ {1,2}, ∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥,>}, and c ∈ N.
The strategy quantiﬁer h hAi iϕp denotes the fact that coalition A has a
strategy whose all outcomes satisfy ϕp. Formulas ϕp are called “path for-
mulas”, because they impose requirements on the paths (or executions) of the
game. We only give the semantics on an example: an outcome satisﬁes the
property aU≤5 b if it reaches a location labelled with b within 5 time units,
and only visits states labelled with a (modality U is read “until”).
In the sequel, we use only two simpler modalities, denoted by F∼c ψs
and G∼c ψs. The former, read “eventually”, is an abbreviation of >U∼c ψs;
that is, F≤5 b means that the outcome visits a b-state within 5 time units.
A simpler version with no timing constraint is also available: Fb simply means
that a b-state will eventually be visited. Modality G is the dual, and is read14 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
“always”: G≤5 a means that, in the ﬁrst 5 time units of the execution, only
a-states are visited. The unconstrained version Ga states that only a-states
are visited all along the execution.
The tool Uppaal-TiGA (Behrmann et al., 2007) used for the veriﬁcation in
this paper uses a fragement of TATL. The only modalities that can be used are
h hAi iF and h hAi iG, without nesting, but the clocks of the model can be used
within the formula.
4. Modeling power allocation in communicating systems
We now present our models. We begin with a model made of two simple
communicating devices. This will be our starting point, for which we will show
that Uppaal-TiGA answers quite quickly. We will then extend this model in two
directions, and see that the limits of Uppaal-TiGA are rapidly reached.
4.1. Simple case: two systems, one mode of operation
We model a network of communicating systems as a timed game: each
system is a timed automaton, one of them being the protagonist. They all
follow the same rules, namely:
– the power allocation is discretized, ranging from 0 to some maximal value
(25 in our examples);
– when turned on, each system sets its power to 15;
– at any time, each system can adjust its power allocation in order to main-
tain its SINR between two values (15 to 20 in our examples), but it has to lower
it as long as it exceeds a given threshold.
– each system can be turned on and oﬀ at any time, except that it must
stay in one or the other state for a certain delay before changing anew.
Fig. 4 depicts1 our model. In our examples below, this model will have
identity id = 0, and is the protagonist. The minimum delay is 1 between any
two events in that system, while ondelay and offdelay equal 5 time units.
The SINR for the protagonist is (A · p[0])/(B + C · p[1]), with A = 100, B = 10
and C = 2. State On has three self-loops: the leftmost one increases the power
by one unit, but is possible only if the SINR is below a certain threshold
(represented by m[0] here). The rightmost selﬂoop allows the system to decrease
its power in case it is too high. The third self-loop also decreases the power
1. Let us notice that our model contains guards of the form (A · p[0]) > (B + C · p[1]).
This is not a violation of the syntax of timed automata since the variables p[0] and p[1]
are not clocks variables but discrete variables used to represent succinctly numerous
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Figure 4: A model of a communicating system
allocation if it is too high, but this self-loop in uncontrollable (dashed transition
on Fig. 4), modeling the fact that the system has to lower its power allocation
if the SINR is high enough. The model for the opponent is symmetric.
Thanks to the simulation tool provided by Uppaal-TiGA, we can check that
this system behaves as we expect. For instance, if the protagonist turns on, its
power decreases as long as the antagonist is oﬀ, because of the uncontrollable
self-loop. The system then reaches a stable state, where the protagonist sends
her information with power equal to J = 3. The only allowed transition is then
to turn oﬀ, or to decrease power some more.
If the antagonist comes up, her power is set to 15, and the SINR for the
protagonist is modiﬁed, enabling the transition for increasing her power alloc-
ation. At the same time, the antagonist has to decrease her power allocation.
Again, this converges to some “equilibrium” where both systems have reason-
able values allowing them to send their data.
We then want to model the fact that establishing the communication re-
quires a reasonably high value for the SINR, and more importantly, that com-
munication is broken if the SINR goes below a given threshold. This is modeled
through an extra module playing the role of an observer (in the sense that it16 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
should not interfere with the behaviour of the initial system), which will have
two modes, representing the fact that the communication is established or
broken, respectively. Our observer is depicted on Fig. 5. This simple observer
Figure 5: An observer detecting if the communication is established
can go the state Emit if the SINR is suﬃciently high, but will go back to Stop
as soon as the SINR will be too low. The ﬁrst transition is controllable while
the second one is uncontrollable, modeling the opposite goals of the protagonist
and the antagonist.
We now have a reasonably complete model for our system, and are ready for
checking several properties it should satisfy. Our main aim is to check that the
protagonist has a strategy to enter location Emit. This is expressed through
the following ATL formula:
h hAi iFEmit [Prop1]
which reads “Player A (the protagonist) has a strategy to force the system
reach location Emit”. In the tool Uppaal-TiGA, this is expressed as a control
requirement:
control : A <> (Observer.Emit)
In our model, this property is satisﬁed if constants have reasonable values.
The next step is to check that it is possible to stay in Emit for a suﬃcient delay.
The classical way of expressing this requirement in timed ATL is through the
following formula:
h hAi iF(h hAi iG≤15 Emit) [Prop2]
This reads: “player A has a strategy for reaching a state from which she can
enforce the game to stay in location Emit for at least 15 time units”.
Unfortunately, Uppaal-TiGA is not able to handle such formulas. Still, it al-
lows to use the clocks of the model in the formulas. That’s the reason why our
observer module resets a clock y when entering location Emit: this clock will
be used to measure the time elapsed in location Emit. The requirement we will
check thus writes:
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This time, the requirement is too strong (except for certain values of the
parameters, namely when limL is small enough or if J is high enough2): in many
situation, it can happen that the protagonist will be “surprised” by the ant-
agonist coming up, resulting in a broken communication. This led us to reﬁne
our observer, allowing the SINR to be low for a ﬁnite amount of time. This is
modeled in our new observer, depicted on Fig. 6. The parameter timeout rep-
Figure 6: A more permissive observer
resents the maximal delay before the communication is really broken. In that
setting, being in location Emit2 is not a problem as long as the protagonist has
a way to go back to Emit before the timeout expires. The property to check is
that the observer can be forced to stay in one of the locations Emit or Emit2
for a suﬃciently long time:
h hAi iF[h hAi iG≤15 (Emit∨Emit2)] [Prop3]
Again, we use the same trick as above in order to encode this property in
Uppaal-TiGA :
control : A <> ((Observer.Emit ||Observer.Emit2)&& Observer.y ≥ 15)
4.2. Extended case: two systems, two modes of operation
An interesting extension of our model consists in having several modes of
operation: indeed, depending on the data being sent, the system may need to
have a better ﬂow rate. We thus allow the system to switch to a mode where
the range of the SINR is higher. The modiﬁcation to the models is small: we
simply add two loops on location On, each one corresponding to one of the
two possible modes. The new model is depicted in Fig. 7. Since the observer
2. There is another reason why such a requirement could fail to hold: if the antagonist
has a way for blocking time (a.k.a. Zeno strategy): this could happen if the antagonist
had a way to execute inﬁnitely many transitions in a ﬁnite delay. This is forbidden
in our model thanks to the delay parameters being positive. We could check that, in
the case where the delay parameters are set to 0, the property is always false.18 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
Figure 7: A model with two operating modes
depends only on the values of the p[id] variables, we use the same as the
previous case.
Note that while the changes are small, the computation time was already
much increased. See Section 5 for the list of our results.
4.3. Extending to three players
Another obvious extension of our model consists in adding extra players. In-
deed, it might be the case that our protagonist can react quickly enough against
the arrival of one single player, but the question is now whether two antagonists
could “cooperate” in order to break the communication of the protagonist.
The SINR for the protagonist is now (A · p[0])/(B + C · p[1] + D · p[2]), with
similar values as previously: A = 100, B = 10, C = 2 and D = 2. Hence, we
replace the SINR in the previous model with the new one. The same applies
to the observer as well. Then, the whole system consists now to 3 players:
one protagonist and two opponents. We won’t display the model as it is a
direct adaptation of the previous ones.Power control algorithm for DSL 19
Again, this addition dramatically increases the complexity of the problem,
and Uppaal-TiGA could not achieve the veriﬁcation of our formulas. We man-
aged to get partial results, where the values of the parameters have been sim-
pliﬁed. We report on this in the next section.
5. Veriﬁcation with Uppaal-TiGA
We now explain the results we got when running the model-checker Uppaal-
TiGA (Behrmann et al., 2007) on our models for the properties we are interested
in.
5.1. Model with two players and one operating mode
For this model, the answer to query [Prop1] is almost immediate, and the
answer is positive: the protagonist has a strategy in order to reach location
Emit. However, as already mentioned earlier, if we set ondelay and offdelay
to zero, the formula does not hold anymore, as the antagonist has a “strategy”
that prevents the protagonist to play any move: it consists in always switching
on and oﬀ without any delay.
In the sequel, we will keep positive values for the delays.
We now check if Property [Prop2] holds. When setting both limL and limH
to 15 (with I = 15 and J = 3) the property fails to hold, which is checked
by Uppaal-TiGA within 30 seconds. Of course, if we lower the value of the
bound limL or if we increase the value of J, the property can be recovered.
Also, we can prove that it is possible to stay in location Emit for at least 5
time units: this is because the power is set to a high value when beginning the
communication, and decreases slowly. During that time, the protagonist can
stay in location Emit.
We can also allow the SINR to go below the bound for a limited delay, as
encoded using the enhanced observer and Property [Prop3]. Again, we tried
our experiments with both limL and limH set to 15, and with I = 15 and J = 3.
With a timeout value of 3 time unit, Uppaal-TiGA has be able to prove that
Property [Prop3] holds. The computation time was around 3 minutes. Again,
we could check that the values of the parameters are tight in this case, as the
property fails to hold if we have a smaller timeout.
5.2. Model with two players and two operating modes
In our ﬁrst extension, where each system has two modes, Property [Prop1]
is again quickly shown to hold. With our values of the parameters, the extra20 e soumission à JESA – Numéro spécial
mode does not provide a way for the protagonist to prevent the communication
from being broken at some point: Property [Prop2] still fails to hold with our
values. What is more surprising is this slight extension makes veriﬁcation much
harder: it now takes 36 minutes for Uppaal-TiGA to check the second property.
Checking that Property [Prop3] holds in our model was even harder: it took
Uppaal-TiGA more than 6 hours and 30 minutes to check this property. In our
example, lowering the upper bound for p[id] does not help since “high” values
are unreachable.
The fact that property [Prop3] holds is not surprising by itself: the cases
when the communication is broken occur, roughly, when the antagonist initiates
a new communication while the protagonist has low power. The new mode
allows the protagonist to have higher power, which makes Property [Prop3]
hold “more robustly”.
5.3. Model with three players
The size of the system dramatically increases with the addition of an ex-
tra player: while the graphical representation of Uppaal-TiGA is very succinct
thanks to the use of variables, each location of our small models represent in
fact a set of 25 locations (because we have discretized our model with that
maximal value).
Still, the ﬁrst property is checked quite easily in case there is only one mode
of operation. By simplifying our model (lowering the upper bound of p[id]
to 16, which does not change the satisfaction of our property, merging both
Off locations, and setting all delays to 1), we were able to prove that Prop-
erty [Prop2] fails to hold. This simpliﬁed model could also be used for proving
that Property [Prop3] fails with a timeout value of 3. Due to the third player,
the timeout has to be raised to 4 in order to satisfy Property [Prop3]. Checking
this latter property took 17 hours.
Apart from those simpliﬁed cases, Uppaal-TiGA has not been able to check
any other properties of our three-player model. The model obtained by com-
bining both extensions (2 modes and 3 players) is too large to be handled by
the tool, even with our simple property [Prop1].
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a timed-automata-based study of the prob-
lem of power allocation in telecommunication networks. The interest of our
approach is twofold: on the one hand, this approach using timed automata and
timed games is original in the ﬁeld of telecommunications, and seems promising
in view of our ﬁrst results: instead of studying the equilibria that can be reachedPower control algorithm for DSL 21
in telecommunication networks, it focuses on the perturbations brought by the
arrival of new senders on the network.
On the other hand, our approach shows the performances and limitations of
the state-of-the-art tool Uppaal-TiGA : the veriﬁcation of timed games has very
high theoretical complexity, as witnessed by the fact that small additions to
our model can importantly increase the duration of the computation. However
the tool is quite handy for building the model, and could be used to verify
non-trivial properties of our system.
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